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Structural theories of collusion posit that demand and supply char-
acteristics of an industry's structure can be used to determine the likeli-
hood of anticompetitive cooperation by competitors.1 A variety of
structural approaches have been advocated by academics 2 and applied
by both enforcement agencies 3 and courts.4
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1. Structural theories have many antecedents. See, e.g., G. Stigler, A Theory of
Oligopoly, in The Organization of Industry 39-63 (1968); Hay & Kelley, An Empirical
Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J.L. & Econ. 13 (1974). More generally, these
theories follow the Structure-Conduct-Performance (S-C-P) paradigm of Joseph Bain,
under which structural variables (such as seller concentration) were modeled to affect
conduct variables (such as collusion or competition) which in turn were to affect per-
formance variables (such as profits). J. Bain, Industrial Organization 43 (2d ed. 1968).
Although conduct can conversely affect structure, see, e.g., infra note 4 (predatory be-
havior will influence seller concentration), such feedback effects are beyond the scope of
this Article. Bain's S-C-P paradigm has gained widespread acceptance. See, e.g., F.
Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 3-7 (2d ed. 1980);
Weiss, The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm and Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1104 (1979).
2. For example, Judge Richard Posner has championed a structural approach for
detecting and punishing antitrust collusion. See R. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Eco-
nomic Perspective 55 (1976); R. Posner & F. Easterbrook, Antitrust: Cases, Economics
Notes and Other Materials 336 (1981); 6 P. Areeda, Antitrust Law 1430, at 178-82
(1986).
3. The Federal Trade Commission has examined structural characteristics to focus
investigative resources on suspect industries. For a history of the FTC's attempts at
targeting collusion, see D. Pender & M. Coate, Case Generation and Remedies 8 (F.T.C.
Collusion Project Working Paper No. 3, June 29, 1984) (unpublished paper on file at
the Columbia Law Review).
4. At least one court has considered structural evidence as a plus-factor for infer-
ring the actual existence of collusion. See, e.g., Wall Products Co. v. National Gypsum
Co., 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Calif. 1971) (stressing structural characteristics of the rele-
vant market that predisposed it to collusion); see also R. Posner, supra note 2, at 73 &
n.52 (discussing implications of case).
While this Article investigates how structure affects collusive behavior-that is, ef-
forts to make competitors cooperate-the structural approach also applies to identifying
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Any structural theory, however, must at bottom rest on an under-
standing of the necessary conditions for collusion. To collude effec-
tively, firms must be able (1) to reach an agreement, (2) to detect
breaches of the agreement, and (3) to punish firms that breach.5 Advo-
cates of the structural approach have suggested a variety of market
characteristics that affect these conditions. Some characteristics (such
as seller concentration, or the homogeneity of the product) relate to
the ease of reaching an agreement; others (such as stable demand, or
announcement of the lowest sealed bid) affect the ability to detect
price-cutting breaches. However, none of the structural variables cur-
rently considered by academics or enforcement agencies 6 relate to the
third condition for successful collusion-the necessity of being able to
punish breach; thus the current list of structural variables is systemati-
cally incomplete. This omission of variables affecting the ability to pun-
ish may explain the empirical failure of the structural approach to
identify collusion.7
Focusing on the necessity of self-enforcement can also serve to
harmonize economic and legal conceptions of collusion. Legal scholars
have traditionally distinguished between explicit and tacit collusion.8
The law punishes the former, so that the act of communication is of
central importance. 9 For economists, however, this distinction has no
the likelihood of exclusionary behavior-that is, efforts to exclude competitors from a
market. For example, a structural analysis could be used to analyze the feasibility of the
exclusionary practice of predatory pricing. See Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework for
Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 Yale L.J. 213, 225-31 (1979).
5. See Osborne, Cartel Problems, 66 Am. Econ. Rev. 835, 835 (1976). A cartel
must also be able to deter the entry of new competitors-so that variables tending to
indicate the presence of barriers to entry would be appropriate under the structural
approach. Entry deterrence, however, can be considered a cartel agreement with poten-
tial competitors not to enter rather than an agreement with existing competitors.
6. For a complete list (of more than 25 variables), see M. Coate, The Application of
the Structure-Conduct-Performance Theory to Oligopolistic Industries (May 1984) (un-
published manuscript on file at the Columbia Law Review). Factors favoring the ability
to reach agreement are: high seller concentration, a small number of sellers, low buyer
concentration, a large number of buyers, similar buyers, inelastic demand at the compet-
itive price, a homogeneous product, industry competition based on price, similar verti-
cal integration, similar cost structure, nondurable products, high transportation costs,
high fixed to variable costs, single product technology, numerous antitrust convictions, a
history of regulation, social structure, similar future expectations, similar future oppor-
tunities, and entry barriers. Id. at 40. Factors favoring the ability to detect breach are:
sealed bidding, frequent small orders, static or declining demand, predictable demand,
and sale of products separately. Id.
7. Frederick Scherer, a former Director of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau
of Economics, summed up his experience with the structural approach: "While I was
with the FTC, we had an active effort to identify potential price-fixing cases using only
structural evidence. The kindest thing I can say about the effort is that it was a resound-
ing flop." Scherer, Book Review, 86 Yale L.J. 974, 982-93 (1977).
8. See Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655 (1962).
9. Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Dist. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954)
296 [Vol. 87:295
HeinOnline -- 87 Colum. L. Rev. 296 1987
HOW CARTELS PUNISH
meaning. 10 In game theory models of collusion, the term "agreement"
does not imply a formal communication-all that is needed is for the
cartel members to have an "understanding" of how others will react to
their behavior. 1 Such shared beliefs-whether acquired tacitly or
not-can support a self-enforcing, collusive equilibrium. The analysis
in this Article will thus have policy implications for both tacit and ex-
plicit collusive agreements. Since tacit agreements can also be self-en-
forcing, the theory provides no clear reason for exempting such
collusion from the concern of antitrust.
Note, though, that the meeting of the minds involved in even an
explicit cartel agreement is very different from the meeting of the
minds in the normal contractual setting. Part of a legal agreement is
the intention that it be susceptible to legal enforcement. 12 Not only is
such intention absent from cartel agreements, these agreements must
in fact include their own enforcement rules. The ability of a cartel to
punish is essential because courts will not remedy the breach of an ille-
gal contract. (In fact, by revealing the existence of collusion, the plain-
tiff could face criminal prosecution.)
This Article extends and refines the structural approach by identi-
fying variables that would let us differentiate industries by the ability of
colluding firms to punish breaches of a collusive agreement. The abil-
ity to punish crucially depends upon the credibility of punishment.
This Article provides a rigorous definition of credibility and analyzes
what influences the credibility of various punishments. Threats of pun-
ishment that are not credible will not facilitate collusion. Part I
presents a general theory of self-etiforcing collusion supported by cred-
ible punishments.
Part II catalogs structural variables that might influence the ability
to punish. Colluding firms can punish by either decreasing the demand
or increasing the costs of breaching firms. Demand-side punishments
are especially important because a firm's demand is usually much more
("Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads
into the traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but 'conscious parallelism' has
not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely."); see also 6 P. Areeda, supra
note 2, at 1405 (discussing proof of agreement).
10. Economists instead distinguish between "cooperative" and "non-cooperative"
games-with the difference being that cooperative game players can enter into legally
enforceable agreements. G. Owen, Game Theory 133 (1982). All game-theoretic mod-
els of cartel collusion are therefore explicitly "non-cooperative." But non-cooperative
behavior, in the game-theoretic sense, does not foreclose firms from colluding. See
Friedman, A Noncooperative View of Oligopoly, 12 Int'l Econ. Rev. 106 (1971) (collu-
sive outcomes could be sustained in a non-cooperative equilibrium if credible punish-
ments were sufficiently high).
11. SeeJ. Szep & F. Forgo, Introduction to the Theory of Games xvii (1985).
12. See O'Reilly v. Mitchel, 85 Misc. 176, 148 N.Y.S. 88 (Sup. Ct. 1914); Mitzel v.
Hauck, 78 S.D. 543, 105 N.W.2d 378 (1960); Balfour v. Balfour, 2 K.B. 571, 579-80
(C.A. 1919) (promises were "not intended by either party to be attended by legal
consequences").
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dependent on the actions of competitors than a firm's costs. For exam-
ple, rivals can drastically affect a firm's demand simply by changing
their own prices. This Part begins then by analyzing how price can be
used as a demand-side punishment and examines how industry charac-
teristics can limit the availability of such pricing punishments. It also
presents an account of nonprice demand-side punishments and sug-
gests an explanation of their causes.
Also analyzing supply-side punishments, Part II extends Salop's
work' 3 on exclusionary practices that "raise rivals' costs." It shows that
exclusive dealing or price squeezes can also be used to support collu-
sion by raising a breaching firm's costs after a breach has occurred.
Following Williamson's work on "hostage" exchanges that facilitate
vertical agreements,' 4 it shows how joint ventures and product ex-
changes could serve as hostages that commit firms to more effective
punishment even before a breach occurs.
Exploring the implications of the preceeding analysis, Part III ex-
amines the unique importance of interest rates upon the incentives to
collude. Additionally, Part IV reveals how cartel punishments can be
disguised within otherwise legal arrangements so as to enlist the state's
assistance in enforcing collusive agreements. Part V discusses how
identifying and distinguishing the ability to punish allows policy makers
to target enforcement efforts, identify actual episodes of punishment,
and promote structural characteristics that constrain collusion.
I. THE NECESSITY OF CREDIBLE PUNISHMENT
Because the State will not enforce collusive contracts,1 5 such
agreements must be self-enforcing-that is, parties to the agreement
must find methods of punishing breach themselves. 16 Indeed, even the
simplest prisoner's dilemma game 17 shows that the ability to punish is a
precondition of collusion. Even if the players have unlimited time to
reach an agreement, and even if they know instantaneously when "fink-
ing" occurs, they will both choose to fink on an agreement that cannot
13. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 58.
14. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 67.
15. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 341-42
(1897); 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (declaring illegal "[elvery contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce.").
16. See Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Bus. 27 (1980).
While State enforcement serves multiple goals-including compensation to nonbreach-
ing firms-self-enforcement turns solely on punishment to deter breach.
17. In the prisoner's dilemma game, two criminals must choose independently a
strategy whether or not to inform, or "fink," on the co-conspirator. Because finking is
the dominant strategy, the game demonstrates why there is no honor among thieves.
The essence of the prisoner's dilemma is that the punishment of each prisoner is greater
than would have occurred had enforceable cooperation been possible. See G. Owen,
supra note 10, at 129 (giving formal description of the game); Huber, Book Review, 93
Yale LJ. 1148, 1150-51 (1984) (describing prisoner's dilemma game).
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HeinOnline -- 87 Colum. L. Rev. 298 1987
HOW CARTELS PUNISH
be enforced.18
This self-enforcement constraint creates a crucial relationship be-
tween punishment and a firm's decision whether to breach. Most gen-
erally, a firm will abide by a collusive agreement only if
Profitbrmch < LOSSpunishment (1)
where "Profitbrmch" refers to the additional profits that a firm expects to
make from breaching the collusive agreement in the current period,
and "LOSSpunishment" refers to the loss of profits in future periods that a
firm expects if it breaches.19 Condition (1) must hold separately for
each colluding firm if no breach is to occur.
Traditionally, we think that firms collude by fixing a super-compet-
itive price and that pricing slightly below this price (price chiseling)
constitutes the breach of the collusive agreement.20 A firm can increase
its short-term profits by price chiseling because with slightly lower
prices it can capture a substantial portion of the industry's profitable
sales.
A. The Profits from Breach
An upper limit on the size of the additional profits from breach can
be derived if we assume that the firms' products are perfect substitutes.
The assumption of perfect substitutability implies that by reducing
price slightly, a breaching firm can capture the entire market demand. 2'
In an industry with N cartelized firms and constant marginal costs, con-
sider a cartel22 that restricts output and divides production equally
among the N firms, with each firm earning cartel profits, Profitc,,,,y. An
individual firm that decides to breach the cartel agreement by charging
slightly less than the cartel price can increase its production N-fold and
its profits by approximately
Profitbrach = (N- I)Profitcartei. (2)23
18. To isolate the importance of cartel punishment in the following analysis, cartels
are assumed to reach agreement and detect defection costlessly; additionally, it is as-
sumed that no firms can enter the cartel's industry. See infra notes 28 & 135 and accom-
panying text for discussion of how the need for reaching agreement and detecting
breach interacts with the punishment prerequisite.
19. This analysis explicitly assumes a model in which firms breach and punish in
different, discrete time periods.
20. See Landes, An Introduction to the Economics of Antitrust, in R. Posner & F.
Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 1065-66.
21. This limitation also assumes that firms are not capacity constrained. See infra
notes 29, 39-41 for discussion of capacity constraints.
22. A cartel is a group of firms that agree explicitly or tacitly to collude on price or
other competitive factors. For a discussion of the difference between explicit and tacit
collusion, see supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text, infra notes 118-24 and accom-
panying text.
23. Under this extreme assumption of perfect substitutability, a firm that undercuts
the cartel price by an infinitesimally small margin could come arbitrarily close to earning
the total cartel's profits of all firms in the cartel, N X Profit,-,.,, a gain of (N - 1) X
Profita.,,,. over what it would earn if it did not breach. If, however, the market were
1987] 299
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By fixing a more competitive price, firms in a cartel could lower
their profits, Profitc,,, and therefore lower the possible profits from
breaching, ProfitbrcCh. Thus, for any fixed punishment,2 4 a cartel can
satisfy the no-breach requirement of condition (1) by lowering the car-
tel price sufficiently. This insight suggests that higher punishments
could support greater collusive profits, 25 and that cartels will not always
act as a monopolist would.
This second point is especially important since a recurring ap-
proach to antitrust begins by asking whether observed behavior is con-
sistent with the behavior of a monopoly firm. If it is not consistent, the
inference is that competition must exist. 26 However, once we appreci-
ate how punishments relate to self-enforcement, the alternative to mo-
nopoly behavior as an explanation is not necessarily competition, but
may well be intermediate types of collusive behavior-as cartels at-
tempt to reduce the profits from breach in order to make collusion self-
enforcing.27
The profits from breach can be limited by the speed of cartel retali-
ation. Inherent in the concepts of breach and punishment is the idea
that a breach must temporally precede any punishment. It is during
this temporal gap that the profits from breach are made. The ability to
detect breach can limit these profits by reducing this interval-the
faster the breach can be detected, the sooner the punishment can com-
mence.28 Indeed, if breaches could be detected instantaneously, the
characterized by product differentiation (so that products were not perfect substitutes),
the profits from breach would be lower.
24. The conditions under which the cartel punishment is not fixed (that is, varies
with Profit,,,,) are discussed infra note 83 and accompanying text.
25. As used here, a punishment will "support" a given degree of collusion if the no-
breach requirement of condition (1) is satisfied. Even high cartel punishments, how-
ever, cannot support cartel profits higher than those of a monopoly. This is true even if
price discrimination is possible. If a cartel has been price discriminating as a monopo-
list, a breaching firm could analogously capture the industry's profits by slightly under-
cutting each of the cartel's various prices.
26. Posner, for example, argues that the dramatic rise of cigarette prices while de-
mand dropped during the Depression was inconsistent with monopoly behavior, and
that therefore there was no satisfactory economic basis for the view that the producers
were conspiring to monopolize. See, e.g., Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A
Suggested Approach, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 1562, 1585-87 (1969). Even so, such price in-
creases are equally inconsistent with competitive behavior.
27. See, e.g., Rotemberg & Saloner, A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars
during Booms, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 390 (1986) (cartel punishment model incorporating
possibility of intermediate collusion); I. Ayres, Deriving Cartel Behavior in a Model with
Fringe Competition 10-11 (July 10, 1986) (unpublished manuscript on file at the
Columbia Law Review) (cartel may prefer less collusive behavior that supports large
collusive group).
28. This fact-that punishment must occur after breach-also implies that the fu-
ture profits lost due to punishment must be discounted to their present value in condi-
tion (1). The interest (or discount) rate then becomes an important structural
characteristic. See infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
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profits from breach would be driven to zero because firms could punish
immediately by charging the competitive price. Firms consequently
would have no incentive to breach collusive agreements. When detec-
tion is not immediate, the relative magnitude of loss due to punish-
ments becomes important in determining whether an agreement will be
self-enforcing. Thus, by taking account of the ability to detect
breaches, the current structural approach analyzes the determinants
and probable size of the profits from breach, the left hand side of con-
dition (1).29 The thrust of this Article, conversely, is to analyze the de-
terminants of the right hand side of condition (1)-the ability to
punish.
B. The Lost Profits from Punishment
Although the foregoing analysis indicates that a cartel will want to
set punishments as high as possible, such punishments nevertheless are
subject to limits. The threat of a severe punishment will deter breach
and support higher cartel profits. But the size of such punishment
threats is limited by the restriction that the threats be credible. The re-
quirement of credibility arises from the failure of courts to enforce any
part of a collusive agreement. Collusive agreements must not only in-
clude provisions to restrict competition (for example, by raising prices);
they must also include provisions on how to punish. Punishments must
be credible because courts will refuse to enforce either type of agree-
ment-just as they refuse to remedy failures to restrict competition,
they will not remedy failures to punish. Punishments thus are used to
make the competitive restrictions self-enforcing; the requirement of
credibility makes the provisions to punish self-enforcing.
While extremely severe punishment threats will be in each cartel
member's interest before any breach, for such threats to be credible it
must remain in each firm's interest to carry out the punishment once a
breach actually occurs.30 It is important to stress that this requirement
of credibility must hold independently for each individual firm. For a
punishment threat to be credible, each firm must decide, given that the
other firms will punish, that punishing is in its best interest-in other
words, is profit-maximizing behavior.3'
29. The possible profits from breach might have other determinants that cause
them to diverge from the upper bound in equation (2). If, for example, the breaching
firm faces constrained capacity at the collusive level of production, it would not be able
to capture the industry's entire demand and the profits from breach would accordingly
be reduced. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
30. For example, a threat to disclose publicly a trade secret known only to all cartel
members if there is a breach would not be credible because such disclosure might irre-
versibly impair the cartel's ability to price above the competitive level. For general ex-
aminations of credibility, see Dixit, Recent Developments in Oligopoly Theory, 72 Am.
Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proceedings) 12, 13-14 (1982); Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining,
46 Am. Econ. Rev. 281 (1956).
31. In a game theory model of collusion, firms are the "players," whose choices to
1987]
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In the example of equation (2),32 the most direct way for a cartel to
punish breach is to lower the cartel price in subsequent periods. Low-
ering the post-breach price would lower the breaching firm's future
profits. The loss to individual breaching firms subjected to this punish-
ment, Losspunishment equals the (present value of the) difference between
the continued cartel profits and these lower post-breach profits. The
cost of the punishment to the breaching firm equals these foregone fu-
ture profits. Indeed, in an industry with constant unit costs of produc-
tion, the most severe credible punishment would be for every firm in
the industry to charge the zero-profit competitive price.33
Such a punishment threat is credible because, even after breach,
no individual firm has an incentive to deviate from the punishment
price. Given that the other firms in the market charge the competitive
price, no firm could sell any output at a higher price.3 4 More severe
punishments (charging sub-competitive prices, for example) are not
feasible, because the breaching firm could simply cease production and
thereby avoid sustaining a loss.
This zero-profit punishment represents a structural upper-bound
punish or not punish represent different "strategies" for playing the "game." From the
point of view of a single firm, a "Nash equilibrium" for such a game consists of a set of
strategies from which individual players have no incentive to deviate. See G, Owen,
supra note 10, at 6. The criterion for credibility formally defines such a Nash equilib-
rium. Credible punishments must therefore be Nash equilibrium strategies.
32. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
33. "Zero-profit" is used here and throughout in the academic sense that firms earn
only the competitive (market rate) return on their investments with no added rents or
"economic profits." See R. Lipsey & P. Steiner, Economics 199 (4th ed. 1975).
34. This zero-profit punishment is an example of a Nash equilibrium for the pricing
game, developed by Bertrand in 1847, in which firms punish by lowering price. SeeJ.
Friedman, Oligopoly and the Theory of Games 38-39 (1977). However, when firms
punish by raising output instead of lowering price, as first analyzed by Cournot in 1838,
positive punishment profits are possible. See id. at 35-37. This is because the Nash
equilibrium for the Cournot quantity game yields a super-competitive price.
Because Cournot profits are higher, Cournot quantity punishments are accordingly
less severe than Bertrand pricing punishments, and credible self-enforcement is more
difficult to achieve. However, while quantity games are more profitable, theory suggests
that firms cannot choose between the quantity and pricing games. Instead, structural
characteristics of the industry make either quantity or price competition more likely.
Specifically, capacity constraints have been found to induce quantity competition. See
Kreps & Scheinkman, Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield
Cournot Outcomes, 14 BelJ. Econ. 326 (1983). The Cournot quantity game is there-
fore analyzed with the discussion of capacity constraints. See infra notes 39-41 and
accompanying text.
The Nash equilibrium of the Cournot quantity game also clarifies the notion of col-
lusion used in this Article. Since even a Nash equilibrium for the Cournot game played
only once yields positive profits, the ability to punish is not a necessary condition for
super-competitive pricing. But credible punishments are necessary to support "collu-
sion." Collusion as used in this essay refers then to agreements that yield greater profits
than any single-period Nash equilibrium. See Abreu, Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolis-
tic Supergames, 39 J. Econ. Theory 191, 191-92 (1986) (using this definition for
collusion).
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benchmark. 35 Maybe the most striking feature of this pricing punish-
ment is that the punishing firms, in exacting the punishment, are hurt
just as much as the firm that breached the collusive agreement. Game
theory tells us that such punishment threats can be credible if each firm
believes that its competitors will punish.36 Nevertheless, a cartel may
have difficulty creating such beliefs in large part because the pricing
punishment is so damaging to the cartel's rank and file. Cartels thus
will strive to construct more efficient punishments-that is, punish-
ments in which the breaching firms will be forced to absorb a greater
proportion of the punishment cost than the punishing firms. For exam-
ple, if the cartel has operated by dividing the market into exclusive geo-
graphical territories, a targeted punishment might consist of selective
price cuts to the breaching firm's territory.3 7
Punishments that are targeted to hurt the breaching firm more
than the punishing firms are, therefore, likely to be more credible be-
cause the cartel can more easily establish the belief that the punishment
will be exacted. Targeted punishments can be made even more credi-
ble if non-breaching firms that fail to punish run the risk of being pun-
ished themselves in subsequent periods. 38
35. Setting the cartel price to the competitive price represents, it should be
stressed, the most severe punishment per period, but does not indicate the most severe
length of punishment. Some pure game theory models generate punishments of this
type that continue indefinitely. See, e.g., Rotemberg & Saloner, supra note 27, at 398.
However, in a world with uncertainty, cartels will fear being locked into punishment
strategies of infinite length-even if such a threat ex ante deters more chiselling-and
therefore will need to agree on the length of time that a punishment will be inflicted.
Other models provide incidences of punishments of limited length under conditions of
uncertain demand. See, e.g., Green & Porter, Noncooperative Collusion under Imper-
fect Price Information, 52 Econometrica 87 (1984); Porter, A Study of Cartel Stability:
The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886, 14 Bell J. Econ. 301 (1983) [hereinafter
Porter, Bell] (estimating length of punishment); Porter, Optimal Cartel Trigger Price
Strategies, 29 J. Econ. Theory 313 (1983).
If there are the same fixed costs of production in every period, the optimal punish-
ments become extremely complicated, cf. Dasgupta & Maskin, The Existence of Equilib-
ria in Discontinuous Economic Games, 2: Applications 8-13 (London School of
Economics, June 1982) (analyzing analogous fixed capacity game). Breaching firms
could not be subjected to punishments in which they expected to lose money because
these firms would choose instead to exit the industry or not to produce.
36. Indeed, history provides examples of extreme price wars. See infra note 125.
37. See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 710 (1948) (describing pun-
ishment of cement cartel that involved "selling cement in a recalcitrant price cutter's
sales territory at a price so low that the recalcitrant was forced to adhere to the estab-
lished [cartel] prices").
38. This punish-or-be-punished inducement has an analog in the codes of legal eth-
ics, in which failure to report infringements of the code subjects a nonreporting lawyer
to discipline as well. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 8.1 (b), 8.3 (1983);
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-101(B), 1-103 (1977).
The dichotomy between targeted and non-targeted punishment has an analog in
game theory. Both targeted and non-targeted punishments still must produce Nash
equilibria in order to satisfy the requirement of credibility. See supra note 31 and ac-
1987] 303
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The next Part extends this simple model of cartel punishment not
only by examining structural characteristics that limit the size of credi-
ble price punishments, but also by examining ways that cartels can pun-
ish other than by cutting price. The goal is to show both that the
extreme pricing punishment of this section will often not be credible,
and that other credible, and sometimes targeted, punishments may be
available in its stead.
II. IDENTIFYING STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF PUNISHMENT
This section presents and analyzes several factors that can influ-
ence the magnitude of a cartel's credible punishment threat. It shows
how the pricing punishments of the previous section can be limited by
capacity constraints and product differentiation. Additionally, many
other types of nonprice punishments are identified, with a discussion of
their availability in specific industries.
A. Limits to Punishment Pricing
The elementary relationship between price and demand informs
our analysis of punishment pricing. In order for cartel firms to achieve
the zero-profit punishment price, they must be able to increase output
sufficiently to drive the price down to the competitive level. 39 Anything
that limits cartel firms' ability to produce will limit their ability to
punish.
Capacity constraints therefore will directly limit a cartel's ability to
punish if the industry does not have the capacity to produce the com-
petitive output.40 In this situation, even with the most severe cartel
companying text. Non-targeted punishments are "single-period" Nash equilibria be-
cause they satisfy the requirements for a Nash equilibrium on a period-by-period basis.
More specifically, non-targeted or "single-period" punishments, such as setting a zero-
profit cartel price, are credible when no firm has an incentive to deviate from punish-
ment, looking at the payoffs of that single period alone.
Targeted punishments, in contrast, are "multiperiod" Nash equilibria, because they
can be credible even if firms have single-period incentives not to punish. Credibility can
be established dynamically in such a case if a firm's failure to punish makes it subject to
punishment in subsequent periods. For other examples of targeted punishments, see infra
text accompanying notes 61-62 (exclusive dealing); 75 (exchange agreements); see also
Abreu, supra note 34, at 197-220 (describing for the first time optimal mutiperiod pun-
ishments).
Note that even single-period punishments can be inflicted for multiple periods if
cartel members agree originally to repeat the punishments for a specific number of time
periods. For example, if the zero-profit punishment of equation (2) is credible, a cartel
could agree to punish breach by going to the competitive price for six months. See
supra note 35.
39. For a discussion of when quantity competition is more likely than price compe-
tition, see supra note 34. If the punishing firms charged the competitive price but pro-
duced less than the competitive output, there would be excess demand, which could
enable the breaching firm to sell goods at a super-competitive price.
40. Recall, however, that if the breaching firm is capacity constrained, the profits
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punishment, a breaching firm will still earn more than the competitive
zero-profit amount while being punished. Thus, the existence of capac-
ity constraints among nonbreaching firms can exert a pro-competitive
influence on an industry.41
This analysis also indicates that inventories might be held in part as
a punishment threat. When capacity constraints limit the supportable
amount of collusion, firms may agree to hold inventory solely for the
purpose of deterring price chiseling.42
Finally, product differentiation will reduce the severity of pricing
punishments.43 If products are differentiated, rivals will be able to sell
at different prices and even competitive pricing by rivals will not drive a
breaching firm's profits to zero. The most severe credible punishments
in markets with product differentiation therefore generally will give the
breaching firm positive profits.44 Differentiation has traditionally been
modeled to affect only the ability to collude by making it more difficult
to reach agreement and detect breach,45 but, as the analysis here indi-
cates, it can reduce the ability to punish breach as well.
46
from breach will be reduced. Because industry-wide capacity constraints can reduce
both the prizes and punishments of price chiseling, it is impossible to label them cate-
gorically as pro- or anti-competitive. In industries where the amount of unused capacity
differs among firms, the firms with the most excess capacity not only have the most to
gain by breaching the collusive agreements, but also paradoxically are the ones most able
to punish other breachers. A firm that is producing at capacity under a collusive regime
can neither gain by prior chiseling nor punish other chiselers.
41. The competitive impact of capacity constraints is formally modeled in B.
Bernheim & M. Whinston, Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior (Apr. 1986) (un-
published manuscript on file at the Columbia Law Review); Rotemberg & Saloner, supra
note 27, at 392-98; see also Brock & Scheinkman, Price Setting Supergames with Capac-
ity Constraints, 52 Rev. Econ. Stud. 371, 371 (1985) (examining use of "industry capac-
ity in enforcing collusion"); Saloner, Excess Capacity as a Policing Device, 18 Econ.
Letters 83, 83 (1985) (dominant firms might invest in excess capacity to discipline com-
petitors).
The most counterintuitive application of this theory is found in Rotemberg &
Saloner, Quotas and the Stability of Implicit Collusion (M.I.T. Department of Econom-
ics Working Paper No. 419, May 1986). The authors demonstrate how import quotas
can promote competition. Quotas are normally thought to facilitate a division of the
market and therefore to promote collusion. Rotemberg and Saloner show, however,
that imposing quotas can limit the credible cartel punishment in response to breach and
consequently increase competition. Id. at 32.
42. See Rotemberg & Saloner, Strategic Inventories and the Excess Volatility of
Production 1 (M.I.T. Department of Economics Working Paper No. 391, Apr. 1985).
43. That consumers differentiate among products implies that the products are not
perfect substitutes.
44. See Salop, Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods, 10 BellJ. Econ. 141,
148 (1979) (presenting model in which even without collusion, firms in industries with
product differentiation earn positive profits).
45. See, e.g., R. Posner & F. Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 337.
46. Product differentiation may also reduce the profits from breach, so as with ca-
pacity constraints, see supra note 40, the specific context of differentiation will deter-
mine whether self-enforcement is enhanced or not.
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B. Nonprice Punishments
While most commentators have focused solely on the availability of
pricing punishment,47 cartels may have numerous nonprice instru-
ments that can influence the level of punishments and ultimately the
ability to collude. These instruments conveniently can be divided into
those that affect demand and those that affect cost.
1. Punishments that Reduce Demand. - The pricing punishment low-
ers profits by reducing the demand for the breaching firm's products.
But price is not the only strategic factor that influences consumer de-
mand. Firms may also compete for consumers on the basis of several
types of quality (by offering faster delivery, more reliable products, or a
broader selection). A cartel could punish breaches of a cartel agree-
ment48 by reverting to the competitive level of such nonprice variables.
Again the size of these punishments would be limited by the notion of
credibility. But as with pricing punishments, 49 reverting to the compet-
itive level of quality will be credible, 50 because if all other firms are
behaving competitively, no individual firm will have an incentive to
deviate.
Advertising is an important, and in some ways unique, example of
how firms attempt to compete for customers on a nonprice basis. 5' But
what do advertising punishments look like? If a cartel decides to pun-
ish breaches by reverting to more competitive advertising behavior, will
it punish by advertising more or less than the collusive level? The an-
swer is not intuitively clear. This is because the advertising of a single
firm may not only win over the customers of its competitors, but may
also induce new demand for the product in general. To the extent that
firms advertise to increase their relative market share (the market-share
effect), 52 competition would lead to more advertising than collusion.
But one firm's advertising can also increase other firms' demand (the
spillover effect). 53 Since competitive firms do not take account of how
their advertising benefits their competitors, competition might lead to
47. See, e.g., Green & Porter, supra note 35.
48. Notice that breaches now might not only involve price chiseling, but chiseling
along other competitive dimensions as well. Cf. National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC,
345 F.2d 421,423,427 (7th Cir. 1965) ("agreements ... to fix and determine the quality
of macaroni" are per se illegal).
49. See supra notes 20-27, 32-37 and accompanying text.
50. In game theoretic terms, credibility implies that the punishment strategies are
single-period Nash equilibria. See supra notes 31, 38.
51. Schmalensee, Advertising and Market Structure, in New Developments in the
Analysis of Market Structure 373, 373-74 (J. Stiglitz & G. Mathewson eds. 1986).
52. Advertising comparison taste tests (e.g., Coca-Cola versus Pepsi) may have the
primary effect of increasing the market share of the advertiser at the competitor's ex-
pense. See Schmalensee, supra note 51, at 386.
53. Telser, Advertising and Competititon, 72 J. Pol. Econ. 537, 537 (1964). For
example, when a beer brewer advertises on a hot summer day, the demand for other
"refreshing" drinks may rise as well. See F. Scherer, supra note 1, at 386.
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less advertising than collusion. The tension between these two effects
is analyzed in a simple model in the Appendix.
The results of the model in the Appendix indicate that punishment
can either increase or decrease the collusive level of advertising, de-
pending on the relative sizes of the spillover and market-share effects. 54
When the spillover effect dominates, a cartel will punish by advertising
less. 55 When the market-share effect dominates, a cartel will punish by
advertising more. In either case, however, the punishment will be
credible.56
Identifying actual instances of punishment is difficult because ad-
vertising punishments can require either increasing or decreasing the
collusive level of advertising. Moreover, as shown in the Appendix, if
the spillover and market-share effects cancel each other out, the collu-
sive and competitive amounts of advertising will be the same, and ad-
vertising punishments will not be possible. The presence of a spillover
effect makes advertising competition unique, because other demand-
side variables have only the market-share effect.5 7 When there is only
the market-share effect, punishment will unambiguously imply in-
creased expenditures.
2. Punishments that Increase Cost. - Credible punishment can also
emanate from the supply side of the market equilibrium by increasing
the costs of a breaching firm.
54. In the absence of product differentiation, homogeneous or generic products
are most likely to have a predominant spillover effect because advertising will only be
able to increase total market demand for the product and not give individual firms an
advantage. F. Scherer, supra note 1, at 386. "[N]o individual orange grower has an
incentive to advertise... since... advertising would probably not shift much business
toward one particular firm and away from other growers.... But the Florida Citrus
Commission, representing many growers, has a definite incentive to promote the sale of
oranges generally .... Id. at 387.
55. In some markets, firms might respond by targeting advertising to specific con-
sumer groups to reduce the demand for a breaching firm's products.
56. Because the punishments are single-period Nash equilibria, they are by defini-
tion credible. See supra notes 31, 38.
57. For example, if Budweiser begins producing a better tasting beer, the demand
for other beers will not increase.
Investments in research and development might be modeled either as increasing
the quality of a firm's product or as decreasing a firm's costs. To the extent that other
firms benefit from the newly discovered information of their rivals, there may be supply-
side spillover effects from research and development. The spillover effect in general will
result whenever a firm's actions result in public goods upon which its free-riding com-
petitors can benefit. Spence, Cost Reduction, Competition and Industry Performance,
in New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure, supra note 51, at 475, 476,
478 (when "there are substantial spill-overs ... a significant part of the cost-reducing
effects of a single firm's R & D accrue to other firms"). Thus, extending the model of
the Appendix, collusive industries would spend more or less on research and develop-
ment than a competitive industry depending on the relative sizes of these competing
effects. Analyzing specific industries, enforcement agencies or courts could measure the
relative magnitudes of the spillover and market share effects to predict whether punish-
ments would entail increased or decreased expenditures.
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a. Raising Rivals' Costs. - Steven Salop and others have recently
advocated the notion that a firm could credibly undertake a number of
activities that would have an exclusionary effect by "raising rivals'
costs." s5 8 For example, by executing exclusive dealing contracts with
suppliers of an industry input, a firm might raise the costs of rivals that
are forced to seek alternative sources of supply.59 Raising competitors'
costs with such nonprice behavior is much more credible than price
predation, because the predatory firm may be able to profit immedi-
ately by increasing its price.60
The ability to raise competitors' costs depends on a number of
structural characteristics of the suppliers' market. Capacity in the sup-
pliers' market must be limited, and entry barriers must be sufficiently
high so that when part of the suppliers' output is foreclosed, the margi-
nal cost of rivals purchasing the suppliers' output rises.
The ability to raise the costs of other firms can be used as a collu-
sive practice as well. Where supply conditions allow exclusive dealing
contracts to increase rivals' costs, a cartel could use the practice as a
punishment threat. Prior to breach by any cartel member, colluding
firms would produce a restricted output at the lowest cost possible and
therefore would not execute exclusive dealing contracts solely for the
purpose of raising other firms' costs. However, if a cartel member
breached the collusive agreement, the cartel could credibly punish by
raising the breaching firm's cost. At a minimum, the credible punish-
ment could consist of resorting to the competitive number of exclusive
supply contracts with suppliers. 61 But it may be possible for the cartel
to target a punishment more carefully so that it disproportionately af-
58. See Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to
Achieve Power Over Price, 96 Yale LJ. 209 (1986) [hereinafter Krattenmaker & Salop,
Yale]; Krattenmaker & Salop, Competition and Cooperation in the Market for Exclu-
sionary Rights, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proceedings) 109 (1986); Salop &
Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proceedings) 267 (1983).
59. See generally R. Posner & F. Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 725-902 (discussing
exclusive dealing and related exclusionary practices). Such exclusionary practices have
been prohibited. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S.
585 (1985); KIor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
60. In contrast, price predation requires firms to forego current profits on the hope
that, after rivals are driven from the industry, monopoly profits will ensue in the future.
Several authors have suggested that the circumstances in which price predation will
be a rational (i.e., profit-maximizing) behavior are at best extremely rare. See, e.g.,
Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263,
268-69 (1981). The Supreme Court has recently moved toward accepting these argu-
ments. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986)
(upholding dismissal of predatory pricing cases; stressing unlikelihood of successful
predation).
61. Under competition, firms might individually have an incentive to raise rivals'
costs for competitive advantage-but if all firms undertake this strategy all costs would
be raised and no competitive advantage would ensue. Society, however, might be disad-
vantaged because the competitive price would reflect these added costs of competing for
exclusionary rights.
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fects the breaching firm. Nonbreaching firms could gang up on a
breaching firm by collectively tying up its sources of supply-such a
punishment might be relatively cheap for individual punishing firms,
but drastically expensive for the punished firm left without access to
any suppliers. Such a punishment could be made credible, because if
any punishing firm refused to take part, it would then also become sub-
ject to the same punishment. 6 2
Indeed, collusive punishments of this sort are more likely to occur
than exclusionary practices, because punishments may be credibly un-
dertaken even when they reduce the punishing firms' profits.6 3 More-
over, while exclusionary strategies must be aimed at raising rivals'
marginal cost (so that rivals will increase their output price),64 punish-
ment strategies to support collusion can be aimed at fixed or overhead
costs as well.65
This analysis might be applied to a number of other tactics that
could credibly raise competitors' costs, including price squeezes, "in-
ducing input suppliers to discriminate against rivals, lobbying legisla-
tures or regulatory agencies to create regulations that disadvantage
rivals, commencing research and development and advertising wars,
and adopting incompatible technologies. ' 6 6 These supply-side punish-
ments all stem from actions that the cartel undertakes after a breach is
detected. The following analysis looks at actions a cartel can take
before breach has occurred in order to make supply-side punishments
more severe.
62. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
63. Krattenmaker and Salop limit the credible exclusionary use of raising competi-
tors' costs to situations where "the acquiror of the exclusionary right has gained power
to raise its price because its acquisition has significantly raised its competitors' costs."
Krattenmaker & Salop, Yale, supra note 58, at 252. In the punishment context, how-
ever, this restriction is inapposite. In most punishment equilibria the punishing firms'
profits decrease; therefore even if the punishing firms (which acquire exclusionary
rights) do not gain power to raise price, this punishment strategy can still be credible.
See supra note 31.
64. See Krattenmaker & Salop, Yale, supra note 58, at 266 ("[b]ecause established
firms' prices in the short run depend on short run incremental costs, then only those
exclusionary rights that increase short run incremental costs" are credible).
65. To deter collusion, punishments need only reduce the breaching firm's profits.
Since either higher fixed or marginal costs reduce profits, fixed-cost punishments can
also be effective. See Krattenmaker & Salop, Yale, supra note 58, at 250 n.129 (distin-
guishing fixed and marginal costs).
66. Salop & Scheffman, Cost-Raising Strategies 3 (FTC Bureau of Economics
Working Paper 146, 1986). Note, however, that lobbying legislatures or regulatory
agencies may be protected under the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine as exercising the right
to petition the government. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657 (1965); Eastern Railroad Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127 (1961); see also California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508 (1972) (recognizing similar right to petition the courts, but refusing to protect
"sham" litigation).
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b. Hostage Exchanges. - Oliver Williamson has analyzed situations
in which firms that traded goods might exchange hostages (for exam-
ple, by posting bonds, or creating sunk costs) to keep each other from
breaching their agreement. 67 Similar hostage mechanisms that facili-
tate horizontal cartel agreements by increasing the ability to punish
breach could develop. Williamson's starting point was that vertical
agreements might be prohibitively expensive to enforce in the courts;68
horizontal cartel agreements are analogous because they are per se
unenforceable. 69
To extend Williamson's analysis to the punishment context, it is
necessary to identify the specific types of assets that cartel firms could
use for horizontal hostages. The essence of a hostage exchange is that
cartel members must invest in assets whose value could be adversely
affected by other firms. This implies that the investments must be irre-
versible or "sunk," and that often the assets will be, to use Williamson's
term, "transaction specific" so that the asset's value if not used with
cartel members is lessened. 70
At first, it would seem that the possibility for horizontal hostage
exchanges is relatively restricted because rival firms lack the technolog-
ical contact that characterize many vertical relationships. 71 In fact, hor-
izontal rivals normally do not exchange goods. But there remain
structural settings where credible hostage exchanges may facilitate col-
lusive agreements.
i. Product Exchanges. - While trade among rivals is the exception,
there are instances "whereby one rival will sell product to another on a
short-term, gap-filling basis so as to provide temporary relief against
unanticipated product shortfalls (occasioned by either demand or sup-
ply changes)."' 72 For example, the major petroleum firms routinely ex-
change oil.7 3 Williamson has suggested that such exchanges could be
efficient in industries characterized by significant economies of scale
67. 0. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 163-206 (1985);
Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 Am.
Econ. Rev. 519 (1983); see also Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appro-
priable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & Econ. 297 (1978)
(vertical integration may be structural alternative to unenforceable vertical contracts);
Klein & Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J.
Pol. Econ. 615 (1981) (discussing extra-legal contractual protection).
68. Williamson, supra note 67, at 526-28.
69. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
70. Williamson, supra note 67, at 522. Williamson suggests that specialized dies,
which cannot be retooled for other projects, are an example of transaction-specific as-
sets. Id. at 524.
71. For example, buyers and sellers must often make transaction-specific invest-
ments to deal efficiently with each other.
72. Williamson, supra note 67, at 528.
73. See, e.g., In re Exxon Corp., 98 F.T.C. 453, 457 (1981) (detailing unsuccessful
government challenge of the practice); In re Weyerhaeuser Co., 49 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1081, 1085-86, 1089 (1985) (examining similar "exchange agree-
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and separate geographic markets. Individual firms in different geo-
graphic markets might invest in more capacity to supply most efficiently
any temporary demand fluctuations in their home market. This extra
capacity represents dedicated assets which are "put in place contingent
upon particular supply agreements." 74
Cartel members could inflict targeted punishments under such cir-
cumstances by refusing to exchange oil with a breaching firm. The
breaching firm would be punished by its creation of unused excess ca-
pacity and by not being able to use its capacity to supply unanticipated
short-falls in other markets. 75
ii. Joint Ventures. - Firms producing competing goods at independ-
ent plants might form a joint venture as a means of increasing punish-
ment threats and therefore the amount of self-enforcing collusion. A
joint venture member, for example, might breach a cartel agreement by
producing more than its cartel quota at its independent plant. The car-
tel might then use its voting power deliberately to mismanage the joint
venture.7 6 Because the value of capital contributions of the cartel
members will depend on the joint venture's economic performance,
mismanagement will constitute a non-targeted punishment that would
lower the value of the breaching firm's capital contribution (as well as
lowering that of the punishing firms). While this analysis is no more
than suggestive, it might be an additional tool to assess, for example,
the probable competitive effect upon social welfare of the General
Motors/Toyota joint venture. 77
iii. Shared Markets. - When firms compete in some markets and
not in others, there may be advantages to establishing passive outposts
ments" in paper pulp industry); 5 The State of Competition in the Canadian Petroleum
Industry 49-54 (R. Bertrand, coordinator 1981).
74. Williamson, supra note 67, at 526, 531-32.
75. Id. at 526, 535 (refusing to exchange oil would result in significant excess ca-
pacity of dedicated assets). A refusal to deal would not be actionable as a breach of
contract if cartel members contemplating using such refusals as a punishment device
were purposely not to enter long-term exchange projects.
In a similar spirit to such product exchanges, one could imagine a variant of the
celebrated case, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), in which
the dominant firms could punish breach by refusing to continue to buy the "distress oil"
of their individual "dancing partners."
76. When the joint venture is run as a corporation separate from the co-investors,
state corporate law protects the co-investors from actions that profit one at the expense
of others. See D. Vagts, Basic Corporation Law 237 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing duty of
loyalty). Actions that generally reduce the value of the joint venture, however, will be
largely immunized by this business judgment rule. See Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d
625, 642-43 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
It may be difficult to make the threat ofjoint venture punishment credible because
the punishing firm may be destroying its own sunk investments at the same time.
77. But see In re General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374 (1984) (not discussing
punishment or disciplinary effect of jointly sunk assets). See generally United States
Department of'Justice, Antitrust Guide Concerning ResearchJoint Ventures (1980) (fail-
ing to consider possible use ofjoint ventures as hostages to support collusion).
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in rivals' territory. Suppose, for example, that there are three separate
markets for a particular product and that firm A dominates the first
market, firm B dominates the second market, and both A and B supply
the third market. If the firms wish to facilitate collusion in the shared
market (the third market), it might be possible to approximate a hos-
tage exchange by having each firm commit to a small level of entry
upon the other firm's turf. Far from being a pro-competitive act, sink-
ing a small amount of fixed capacity in the other firm's market could
credibly increase the cost of breach. For example, if firm A invests sunk
costs78 to establish a relatively small capacity in the second market, it
could be vulnerable to predation by firm B in that market. Firm B could
then respond to price chiselling by firm A in the shared market by reduc-
ing its price in the second market. If there are significant economies of
scale 79 in this industry, the firm with the higher output-firm B-will
be able to exploit these economies and produce at a lower unit cost in
the second market.80 Such predation might be possible because firm B
could lower its price below the cost of firm A while still making a
profit.8 '
These examples of hostage exchanges are meant to be illustrative,
not exhaustive. The goal of this hostage exchange analysis is similar to
the goal of this Part-to demonstrate that cartels may have many more
instruments to punish credibly than normally recognized, and that the
availability of these instruments will often depend on the structural
conditions of demand and supply extant in the industry.
III. THE STRUCTURAL IMPACT OF INTEREST RATES
The previous Part demonstrated how cartels could influence many
of the methods of punishment: cartel members, for example, could
hold larger inventories, build more capacity, or alter advertising levels.
Because the interest rate cannot be determined by firm behavior, this
Part considers separately how the interest rate affects the feasibility of
collusion.
78. See W. Baumol, J. Panzer & R. Willig, Contestable Markets and the Theory of
Industry Structure 280-81 (1982) (sunk costs, such as investment in an automobile as-
sembly line, "cannot be eliminated, even by total cessation of production").
79. See F. Scherer, supra note 1, at 81.
80. This example assumes that transporting goods between markets is
uneconomical.
81. This example illustrates how cartels might be willing to endure substantial costs
(here, in the form of inefficient low-volume production) to make the cartel agreement
self-enforcing. See also infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text (firms may incur
inefficient marketing costs as part of a targeted punishment strategy). This cost of carte-
lization represents wasted resources and is akin to the social cost of monopoly. See
Posner, The Social Cost of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. Pol. Econ. 807, 817-21
(1975).
For a related analysis of self-enforcing collusion in overlapping product markets,
see B. Bernheim & M. Whinston, supra note 41, at 3-5.
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In deciding whether to chisel on a cartel price, firms necessarily
weigh current price-cutting profits against future punishment costs, so
the rate at which future punishments are discounted will affect the car-
tel's ability to collude. The pivotal importance of the interest rate in
determining the size of punishment can be seen by returning to the
simple model of Part 1.82 Assuming that an industry faces stable de-
mand and cost conditions in the future and that the cartel agreement
remains in effect indefinitely, the cartel members will earn Profitcre, in
each future period. The present discounted value of these future prof-
its, PDV, is: PDV = Profitei 
(3)
r
where r equals the rate of interest.8 3 If the optimal zero-profit pricing
punishment is feasible, then the lost profits from punishment will ex-
actly equal PDV. Moreover, if the maximum profits from breach, as
shown in equation (2),84 are obtainable, then by substituting equations
(2) and (3) into equation (1), we can derive that a breach will be de-
terred only if: (N- 1)Profit...i < Profitca 1  (4)
r
which, after simplifying, is: 1
r<N - 1 (5)
This result8 5 is rather striking, because it implies an all-or-nothing out-
come that depends solely on the interest rate8 6 and the number of firms
in the industry. When the interest rate is small relative to the number
of firms, perfect collusion will be self-enforcing. When the interest rate
is relatively large, however, the foregone profits of punishment are dis-
counted sufficiently so that no collusion is possible.
This razor-edge quality is lost, though, once we allow for changes
in future demand or supply conditions.8 7 For example, if the demand
82. See supra notes 20-27, 32-37 and accompanying text.
83. Equation (3) is derived from:
PDV = Profit,,,, (d'), where d -
1 +r
Equation (3) assumes that the cartel profits will last indefinitely. Solving this infinite
sum yields the result of equation (3).
84. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
85. Similar derivations can be found in B. Bernheim & M. Whinston, supra note 41,
at 10-12; Rotemberg & Saloner, supra note 27, at 393.
86. The relevant interest rate will be the rate at which the person deciding whether
to breach (usually the manager) discounts future dollars. A manager that acts in the
shareholders' interests should treat this like any other investment decision, using the
firm's risk-adjusted interest rates for various investment categories as a guide to action.
See R. Brealey & S. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 164-66, 172 (2d ed. 1984).
But see infra note 98 and accompanying text (describing situations when managers
might apply different interest rates).
87. Rotemberg & Saloner, supra note 27, at 395, show how intermediate levels of
collusion are possible for a range of interest rates when demand is allowed to fluctuate.
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in the industry is expected to be lower in the future, the profits from
collusion, Profit,.,e will be lower as well. Breaching firms will accord-
ingly forego less future profits so that the supportable current collusion
will also be reduced.
This analysis might be applied either across industries or across
time. Differing interest rates across industries, for example, might con-
tribute to different propensities for collusion in those industries."8
Moreover, under this analysis, the risk-averseness and myopia of man-
agers becomes a pro-competitive force. Managers are often thought to
discount future profits excessively when making investment decisions,
worrying more about today's profits.89 Such myopia would lead man-
agers to breach collusive agreements far more often than the diversified
shareholder would prefer because the prospect of highly discounted
punishments will not deter them.
Changes in interest rates might also create differing patterns of
collusion within a single industry over time. This could shed light on
Scherer's casual empirical observation that cartels seem to be the prod-
uct of recessions while mergers seem to be the product of booms. 0 If
interest rates vary with the business cycle (that is, are pro-cyclical), 9 '
then during recessions, interest rates would be lower and punishments
would hurt more. The self-enforcement requirement of condition (1)
would thus more likely be fulfilled during recessions, and enforcement
should thus be increased in such periods. 92
Finally, the foregoing analysis of interest rates can explain an inter-
esting wrinkle in the recent demise of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel. As discussed above, the unex-
pected reduction in demand for oil that developed in the 1980's95
could predictably make the prevailing cartel price from the 197 0's un-
supportable. One would expect in these circumstances that OPEC
would have reduced the cartel price to eliminate incentives for breach.
It is at first surprising therefore that cartel participants suggested
that, once chiseling had caused the spot price to drop, the cartel was
unstable because it could not reestablish the price at a sufficiently high
level.9 4 After all, a lower cartel price should have made the OPEC car-
Moreover, structural constraints, such as capacity constraints or speed of retaliation,
may affect the size of either the profits from breach or the punishment. See supra notes
21-46 and accompanying text.
88. Industries face different rates of interest due to different risks and differences in
the correlation of various industry returns with the systematic risk of the economy. See
R. Brealey & S. Myers, supra note 86, at 164, 172-73.
89. R. Reich, The Next American Frontier 140-72 (1983).
90. See F. Scherer, supra note 1, at 126-27 (mergers), 214-19 (cartelization).
91. See R. Lipsey & P. Steiner, supra note 33, at 417.
92. This result is independently supported by a reduced demand effect in the busi-
ness-cycle model of Rotemberg & Saloner, supra note 27, at 395.
93. See Silk, Confronting New Oil Fears, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1986, at D2, col. 1.
94. Cf. e.g., OPEC's Third-Quarter Production Target Too High to Stabilize Mar-
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tel more stable. This paradox can be explained by clarifying the rela-
tionship beween interest rates and punishment.
A major difference between OPEC and other cartels is that the
member "firms" are countries. Some commentators have thought that
OPEC countries had minimum revenue requirements that would not be
met if the cartel price were too low.9 5 The effect of these revenue
requirements on the incentive to breach can be expressed as a change
in interest rates. In formal game-theoretic models, the interest rate
represents the probability that the game will end in the next period.96
If the game ends, there can be no punishment. Thus, the expected
punishment should be discounted by the probability that the game will
end. For example, if there is a 10% chance that the game will end in
the next period, firms will discount future punishments by 10%o to cal-
culate the expected punishments from breach. In the political context
of OPEC, the analog to the probability that the game ends in the next
period is the probability that the leaders lose the next election or that a
revolution occurs. The revenue requirements then can be seen to influ-
ence directly this probability. Since oil revenues were used to finance
stabilizing social programs, as the revenues declined the probability
that "the game will end" increased. This stylized characterization is
supported by several analysts and by the actual political turmoil that
has followed the decline in price in many countries.9 7
Since oil-country revenues monotonically decrease with lower car-
tel prices, a low cartel price could have caused OPEC countries greatly
to discount future punishment costs. For low cartel prices, even the
small gains from price chiseling could outweigh the prospect of future
punishment if the threat of a revolution or lost election made the rul-
ers' interest rate sufficiently great.98 Thus, the combination of declin-
ket, Platt's Oilgram, Aug. 18, 1986, at I (market analyst argues that OPEC production
quotas are too high to stabilize market at prices "high enough to secure OPEC coun-
tries' revenues").
95. Griffen, OPEC Behavior: A Test of Alternative Hypotheses, 75 Am. Econ. Rev.
954, 956 (1985).
96. See D. Fudenberg &J. Tirole, Dynamic Models of Oligopoly 3-4 (Institute for
Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences Technical Report No. 428, Oct. 1983).
97. See, e.g., Kristof, Economic and Political Shifts Seen if Oil Price Fall Persists,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1986, at Al, col. 2; Stockton, Fall in Oil Price is Galled a Spur to
Mexico Crisis, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 5.
The inverse relationship between oil revenue and the interest rate can more con-
ventionally be seen for the OPEC members that are debtor nations. As oil revenues
decline, the prospects of repayment fall, thus causing the country-specific risk to rise.
See Gargan, Nigeria's Economy Faces New Burden, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1986, at DI,
col. 1.
98. This analogy could be extended to the market for corporate control. Firm man-
agers might have higher discount rates if they believe that the threat of a corporate
takeover will increase if current profits decrease. See supra note 89 and accompanying
text. Takeover threats might have the heretofore unnoticed pro-competitive effect of
encouraging managers to breach collusive agreements.
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ing demand for oil and the impact of declining revenues on the interest
rate could have made any collusive price by OPEC unsupportable.
This example illustrates the importance of interest rates to self-
enforcement of cartel agreements. Since the profits from breach and
the costs of punishment will normally accrue over time, firms will take
account of the time value of money. Analyzing interest rates deter-
mines how much a punishment hurts. Indeed, for sufficiently high in-
terest rates, collusion will become unsupportable as the discounted cost
of future punishments will fail to deter breach. Thus, understanding
this relationship between interest rates and self-enforcement can help
policymakers predict when punishments are most likely to occur.
IV. LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE, DISGUISED PUNISHMENTS
The thrust of the analysis to this point has been centered on cartel
agreements that cannot be legally enforced-indeed such agreements
are criminal99-however, it is not surprising that cartels would try to
incorporate disguised punishments in legally binding contracts to deter
price chiseling. The incentives for such circumvention are great be-
cause the punishments in legally binding agreements are not restrained
by the ex post credibility requirement. 00 This Part briefly examines
three ways a cartel might be able legally to contract to punish price
chiseling. The first two mechanisms, meeting-competition and most-
favored-nation clauses, are commonly analyized as "facilitating prac-
tices." 10' The third mechanism involves patent licensing as illustrated
by United States v. General Electric Co. 10 2
A. Meeting-Competition Clauses
A meeting-competition clause (MCC) is a contractual commitment
by a seller not to be undersold for the life of a supply contract.103 Such
agreements have avoided antitrust prohibition possibly because they
are vertical agreements between buyers and sellers and not horizontal
agreements solely among sellers. 10 4 Nonetheless, as Salop and others
99. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
100. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
101. "Facilitating practices" are so named because they facilitate collusion. See,
e.g., Salop, Practices that (Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Co-ordination, in New Devel-
opments in the Analysis of Market Structure, supra note 51, at 265. Some of these prac-
tices can facilitate collusion by making it easier to reach agreement, and detect price
chiseling. Id. at 269, 273. My purpose, however, is to focus on the practices that make it
easier to enforce collusive agreements with credible punishments.
102. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
103. See Salop, supra note 101, at 279. MCC have been employed in various in-
dustries. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 394 n.5 (1947);
Salop, supra note 101, at 287 n.37.
104. SeeJ. Simons, Fixing Price with Your Victim: Efficiency and Collusion With
Competitor Based Pricing Clauses 53-67 (Oct. 29, 1986) (unpublished manuscript on
file at the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that in oligopolistic markets "competitor
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have shown, an MCC can credibly facilitate the maintenance of a cartel
price.1 05
The anti-competitive impact of an MCC can be given a straightfor-
ward punishment interpretation. An MCC credibly commits rivals to
reduce price in the face of price chiseling. The threat to reduce price is
credible because its enforcement is ensured by third parties, the buyers.
Ironically, the punishment threat is created by contracts with the very
victims of the cartel.106 Although a monopsonist buyer would never
have incentives to sign contracts that would ultimately hurt it and thus
never sign an MCC contract, multiple buyers might have individual in-
centives to enter into MCC contracts. 10 7 This is because, in a market
with an established cartel, increased competition is itself a public good,
the benefits of which individual buyers will not capture. Thus an MCC
can credibly commit rivals to pricing punishments and thus entitle ri-
vals to maintain a higher price than if there were no MCC.
B. Most-Favored-Nation Clauses
A most-favored-nation (MFN) clause is a contractual commitment
by a seller not to sell to other buyers for a lower price for the life of a
supply contract.108 Once a super-competitive cartel price is estab-
lished, an MFN clause also acts to increase the costs of price cuts. Un-
like an MCC, where the rivals are committed to punishing, the MFN
clause is a credible commitment to self-punishment, enforceable by
buyers. 109
Of special interest are retroactive MFN clauses that rebate any fu-
ture price decreases to a buyer.' 10 A firm considering breaching a car-
tel agreement by price chiseling now faces the prospect that it may have
to rebate significant profits from the past if it breaches. The judicial
enforcement of a retroactive MFN clause, therefore, can enable cartels
based formula pricing clauses," which include MCC, can violate the Sherman Act even
in vertical contracts). See generally Clark, Price-fixing Without Collusion: An Antitrust
Analysis of Facilitating Practices after Ethyl Corp., 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 887, 934-35 ("as-
sessment of the impetus for including meet-or-release clauses ... should help to deter-
mine whether, on balance, the use of the clause has positive or negative effects upon
competition").
105. See Salop, supra note 101, at 279-82.
106. SeeJ. Simons, supra note 104, at 49-51.
107. A buyer's refusing to enter MCC contracts would help make the entire market
more competitive, but since each buyer cares only about its own purchase price, it may
not forebear for the benefit of other buyers. Refusing to enter MCC contracts is thus a
public good that benefits buyers in general, but which independent buyers might fail to
refuse. See id.
108. See E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1984)
(permitting use of most-favored-nation clauses).
109. Under certain conditions there is no disadvantage in being the first firm to
introduce the clauses. See, e.g., Cooper, Price Protection Policies and Tacit Collusion,
17 RandJ. Econ. 377, 377 (1986) (discussing MFN clauses).
110. Salop, supra note 101, at 274-75.
1987] 317
HeinOnline -- 87 Colum. L. Rev. 317 1987
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
to circumvent the temporal restriction that punishments can flow only
from reduced future profits.11' Here, price-chiseling can occasion the
loss of past as well as future profits, making this one of the most severe
punishments.
C. Sham Patent Licensing Agreements
Finally, consider the opportunities for including binding punish-
ment threats in sham patent licenses. Such opportunities are illustrated
in the General Electric/Westinghouse light bulb license.1 2 In 1912,
General Electric granted to Westinghouse patent licenses for the manu-
facture and sale of light bulbs. The license required Westinghouse to
maintain the price that General Electric charged for bulbs1 13 and to pay
a royalty of two per cent of net sales-which rose, however, to 10 per
cent if Westinghouse's net sales exceeded 15 percent of General Elec-
tric-Westinghouse total net sales. 114
George Priest has suggested that the license agreement might have
been used to fix price: "A royalty of 2 per cent indicates either that the
patent was trivial and the parties were simply price-fixers, or that Gen-
eral Electric was distributing patent rents in return for an agreement to
fix price and limit output."' 1 5 The increasing royalty is especially rele-
vant to the issue of punishment. For if General Electric's patent were
invalid and the license agreement were entered solely to facilitate
collusion, then the escalating royalty would punish price-chiseling.
Westinghouse would be deterred from giving secret price cuts in order
to increase its output beyond the 15 percent market share that trig-
gered the punishment royalty, which was five times higher.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Policies that reduce the magnitude of credible punishments (or in-
crease the profits from breach) will consequently reduce the amount of
collusion. Thus, public policies should promote structural characteris-
tics that constrain punishment. For example, courts might refuse to en-
force MCC and MFN contracts where collusion is likely.1 16
111. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
112. See United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) (sustaining valid-
ity of patent license). The discussion here is derived from George Priest's original anal-
ysis of the case. Priest, Cartels and Patent License Arrangements, 20J.L. & Econ. 309,
340-49 (1977).
113. See 272 U.S. at 479, 482.
114. See Priest, supra note 112, at 345-46 (citing record).
115. Id. at 346.
116. The United States could apply this analysis to help insure that OPEC does not
revitalize. Simply stated, OPEC could be destabilized by giving individual producer na-
tions greater incentives to breach the OPEC agreement. An optimal strategy of destab-
lization would combine a mixture of carrots (to increase Profith,,,,, in condition (1)) and
sticks (to increase the costs of not breaching). For example, additional or renewed
United States foreign aid to specific oil-producing nations could be conditioned on the
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But even if such characteristics are beyond policymakers' control,
identifying the relationship between structure and punishment has rele-
vance to policy. Judge Posner, for example, has advocated the use of
structural information not only "to enable enforcers to concentrate
their resources in markets where the resources are likely to be em-
ployed most productively" but also to aid in establishing actual "proof
of collusion, explicit or tacit." 11 7
Making punishment threats credible may often be quite compli-
cated. Without explicit communication, reaching an understanding' 18
of what the punishment will be can be quite difficult. Therefore, appre-
ciating the necessity of punishment can rationalize the law's current
emphasis on communication-but at the same time can reveal that for-
mal agreement is not necessary in all structural settings. 1 9 Indeed,
this analysis can refocus the debate between Posner and Turner on
excess production of oil. Linking economic development loans and the refinancing, so
badly needed by some producer nations, to OPEC betrayal might be especially effective.
After all, the need for oil revenues to service existing debts is what induced Nigeria and
Venezuela to cheat in the first place. The International Monetary Fund has been condi-
tioning loans for years on such factors as the borrower's fiscal deficit or money supply.
Destabilization would simply condition aid on a different action of the borrowing state.
Such a policy is feasible. OPEC's recent instability demonstrates that several na-
tions have chosen to chisel of their own accord-so the size of the prizes or punishments
need not be great to make it in individual countries' interest to breach the cartel agree-
ment. And only a few countries need to be so targeted in order to restore competition
in the oil market.
Indeed, the presence of one or a few price cutting firms can have a dramatic
procompetitive effect on a market-consider, for example, the impact of MCI on
AT&T's long-distance telephone rates. See MCI Communications v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1099 (7th Cir.) (one month after MCI announced plans for
nationwide long distance service in selected cities, AT&T sought permission to lower its
long distance rates in many of those cities), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); MacAvoy
& Robinson, Winning by Losing: The AT&T Settlement and Its Impact on Telecommu-
nications, I YaleJ. on Reg. 1, 9-14 & n.52 (1983). More generally, government policy-
makers might consider undertaking single-firm interventions instead of market
intervention (i.e., industry regulation) to correct or improve anticompetitive behavior.
Even private firms have sometimes had incentives to create a competitive presence in
upstream supplier markets or downstream customer markets. See, e.g., United States v.
Columbia Pictures Indus., 507 F. Supp. 412, 419-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (four major film
studios claimed to enter joint venture in pay TV distribution to act as competitor to
existing distributors with large market share).
117. R. Posner, supra note 2, at 55 (structural evidence permits "ambiguous con-
duct to be evaluated"). Posner advocates a two-stage approach to punishing collusion:
"The first would involve identifying those markets in which conditions are propitious for
the emergence of collusion; the second, determining whether collusive pricing in fact
exists in such a market." Id.; see also supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing differences between explicit and tacit collusion).
118. See supra text accompanying note 11.
119. Indeed, this is why the "finking" result of the prisoner's dilemma game never
turns on whether the prisoners are allowed to communicate. See discussion supra note
17 and accompanying text.
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whether tacit agreements should be prohibited.' 20 Turner, who would
legalize tacit collusion, seems to assume in his analysis that the profits
from tacit collusion will be limited because there are no punish-
ments. 21 However, once we allow for the possibility that firms could
tacitly agree on punishment threats as well as on a collusive price, more
anticompetitive levels of collusion are possible.' 22 Thus, Posner's re-
sponse to Turner 123 becomes even more compelling when there is evi-
dence of punishing behavior. While an enforcement agency might not
be able to keep firms from pursuing their best interest given their un-
derstanding of how other firms will react, it can change the "given." By
prosecuting tacit collusion where understandings of punishment are ev-
ident, courts can discourage such understandings from being
established. 124
Thus, identifying variables that might distinguish industries' ability
to punish credibly cannot only aid enforcement targeting, but can also
be a step in identifying after the fact whether punishments actually have
been exacted. Evidence of actual episodes of punishment could then
be used as direct evidence of cartel agreement. For example, the dra-
matic, short-lived price wars in the electrical equipment industry were
persuasive evidence that a cartel existed.' 2 5
Because non-targeted punishments are more difficult for third-
party observers to identify than targeted punishments, targeted punish-
ments should be given special scrutiny. If a punishment consists of re-
verting to competitive behavior (such as the zero-profit punishment
price of Part 1)126 then third parties will not be able to distinguish epi-
120. Compare R. Posner, supra note 2, at 42-55 (arguing that tacit collusion
should create liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act) and Posner, supra note 26, at 1562,
1563-93 (same) with Turner, The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 657-73 (1962) (argu-
ing that § 1 should not reach tacit collusion).
121. See Turner, supra note 120, at 666. Turner's theory of "oligopolistic interde-
pendence" seems to contemplate a Cournot quantity game in which firms earn profits
without punishment threats. See supra note 34; see also R. Posner, supra note 2, at 74
(Turner's theory is "tantamount to arguing that oligopoly is a sufficient as well as neces-
sary condition of tacit collusion.").
122. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
123. See R. Posner, supra note 2, at 74 (criticizing Turner's theory).
124. See id. at 74.
125. A period of dramatically successful collusion in the electrical manufacturing
industry (1955-1959) was bracketed by two severe episodes of punishment. J. Herling,
The Great Price Conspiracy: The Story of the Antitrust Violations in the Electrical In-
dustry 14 (1962) ("The famous 'white sales' in the electrical manufacturing industry was
a fantastic price war that raged from late 1954 until September, 1955."); 1 R. Sultan,
Pricing in the Electrical Oligopoly 71 (1974) ("Between 1959 and 1961 price levels in
the turbine generator industry declined by more than 40 percent."). Punishing price
wars have also been identified in the pre-Sherman Act railroad industry in Porter, Bell,
supra note 35, at 302-03.
126. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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sodes of punishment from breakdowns of the cartel.127 Targeted pun-
ishments, however, are easily distinguished from competitive behavior.
For example, in a market that a cartel has divided into geographic terri-
tories among firms, the targeted punishment of sending extra sales
people into the territory of a breaching firm is especially visible as firms
attempt to increase sales in the market with the lowest mark up.
This Article has identified many types of targeted punishments-
exclusive dealing, territorial targets, and product exchanges-but
others may also be available. For example, in FTC v. Cement Institute,128
the Supreme Court explicitly described a targeted punishment involv-
ing basing point pricing:129
During the depression in the 1930's, slow business prompted
some producers to deviate from the prices fixed by the deliv-
ered price system. Meetings were held by other producers; an
effective plan was devised to punish tie recalcitrants and bring
them into line. The plan was simple but successful. Other
producers made the recalcitrant's plant an involuntary base
point. The base price was driven down with relatively insignificant
losses to the producers who imposed the punitive basing point, but with
heavy losses to the recalcitrant who had to make all its sales on this
basis.130
It is a happy coincidence for society that such targeted punishments,
the most credible form of punishment, are also the most readily identi-
fiable. If enforcement agencies can drive out such targeted punish-
ments, cartels will have to resort to the less visible, but less effective,
non-targeted punishments: breaches of collusive agreements will be
encouraged, and collusion thereby reduced.
127. For example, at this writing it is impossible to know whether OPEC is in a
punishment phase or whether the collusive agreement has been replaced by competi-
tion. Compare Pauly, The Unmaking of an Oil Cartel: Commodity Price Fixing
Schemes Inevitably Fail, Newsweek, Feb. 3, 1986, at 36 (attempt to control oil prices
inevitably gave way to competitive market pressures) with Ibrahim, OPEC Leaders Af-
firm Support for Price War, Wall St.J., Feb. 4, 1986, at 3, col. 1 (OPEC leaders attempt
to re-assert authority of oil cartel by punishing renegade producers with even lower
prices).
128. 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
129. In a "basing-point pricing system" sellers transport the good to the buyer's
place of business and charge a "delivered price"-that is, a price that includes a charge
for the transportation. Id. at 697. Basing-point prices are calculated by determining the
transportation charge as if all goods were shipped from a common base point even if the
goods are shipped from a producer at a much closer location. A well-known early exam-
ple is the "Pittsburgh plus" basing-point system for steel prices, in which "the delivered
price of steel from anywhere in the United States to a point of delivery anywhere in the
United States was in general the Pittsburgh price plus the railroad freight rate from
Pittsburgh to the point of delivery." Id. Producers located between the basing point
and their customers could thus charge customers "phantom freight" for transportation
costs (measured from Pittsburgh) that were not actually incurred. Id. at 697-98.
130. Id. at 714 (emphasis added); see also Haddock, Basing-Point Pricing: Com-
petitive vs. Collusive Theories, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 289, 292-93 (1982) (suggesting that
basing-point pricing will occur in markets with dominant firms and fringe competition).
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Nonetheless, condition (1) suggests that evidence of either
targeted or non-targeted punishment should not be used indiscrimi-
nately to prosecute members of a cartel. To the extent that evidence of
actual punishment is used against the original price chiseler, it will re-
duce the expected profits from chiseling and thus make chiseling less
desirable. This is because a firm contemplating breach will realize that
breaching the cartel agreement may ultimately cause its own prosecu-
tion, with the attending criminal and treble damage liability.' 3l Using
punishment episodes as evidence against the punishers, conversely, is
desirable. Raising the costs of punishment will make severe punish-
ments less credible, so cartels will tend to let more price chiseling go
unpunished to society's benefit.' 3 2
CONCLUSION
The current structural approach fails to recognize the necessity of
being able to punish breaches of cartel agreements. This Article has
examined how cartels can punish price-chiselers, how threats of punish-
ment can be made credibly, and what market characteristics will influ-
ence the size of the credible threat. Some characteristics (such as most-
favored-nation clauses) can clearly increase the ability to punish, others
(such as the spillover and market-share effects on advertisement pun-
ishments) yield clear theoretical answers but may be difficult to identify
in practice, and still others (such as product differentiation or capacity
constraints) require more specific analysis to understand whether the
cartel agreement is likely to be self-enforcing. 133
While the ability to reach agreement may be an all-or-nothing vari-
able, this Article has attempted to show that the ability to punish credi-
bly will instead vary in magnitude.' 3 4 Thus, the need for self-
enforcement will usually not be an impregnable barrier to collusion but
instead will limit the degree of collusion-the amount by which firms
can raise price above cost.' 3 5
131. Indeed, granting immunity from prosecution to any firm that informs the gov-
ernment about the existence of an antitrust conspiracy might be desirable. A breaching
firm could then credibly threaten the non-breaching firms that it will turn state's evi-
dence if it is punished for breaching. Such immunity might thus give breaching firms a
powerfully competitive counterstrategy.
132. This policy may be difficult to implement because it may be difficult to identify
which price-cutters were chiseling and which were punishing. The timing of the price
changes may not always be clear. In addition, identifying nonprice punishments may be
especially difficult. See, e.g., supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
133. The fact that different models can at times yield different results is not a failing
of theory, but a reflection of economic complexity; it means only that with respect to
cartel issues a careful and reasoned choice of model is necessary. See Schmalensee, On
the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The Realemon Case, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 994,
995 (1979).
134. For example, almost any industry will be able to resort to pricing punishments
of varying magnitude.
135. While this Article has isolated the determinants of punishment, the three pre-
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Finally, the analysis of punishment in this Article could also be ex-
tended to a host of diverse agreements that lack legal mechanisms for
enforcement. For example, breaches of criminal conspiracies or inter-
national agreements cannot be rectified by resort to law. 136 Similarly,
the judicial branch will often abstain from enforcing political under-
standings between the executive and the legislature.' 3 7 The analysis
here suggests that a structural approach might fruitfully be applied in
these contexts as well to resolve the same issues of self-enforcement,
punishment, and credibility.
requisites of collusion, see supra note 5 and accompanying text, do interact. Because
self-enforcing collusive agreements must include punishment provisions, see supra text
following note 12, factors that influence the first prerequisite-the ability to reach
agreement-will also indirectly affect the ability to punish. Additionally, the second pre-
requisite-the ease of detection-will, by determining the profits from breach, affect the
needed punishment in a given industry. See supra text accompanying note 28.
136. M. McDougal & W. Reisman, International Law in Contemporary Perspective
1223 (1981).
137. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (describing Supreme Court ab-
stention on basis of "political question" doctrine). A number of academics have used a
"legislation-as-contract" approach to statutory interpretation. See Easterbrook, The
Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv.
L. Rev. 4, 15 (1984); Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 234 (1986) ("if the
parties to a [legislative] contract believe that the bargain they are striking is unenforce-
able, the value of that contract will be significantly diminished").
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APPENDIX
This appendix analyzes a simple model of advertising punishment
to examine the tension between the spillover and market-share effects
described in the text.'38
Following Schmalensee,13 9 suppose that there are N firms in an
industry cartel with constant unit cost (c). To simplify the analysis and
to highlight the effect on advertising, assume that the cartel has agreed
to sell at a fixed cartel price (P) and to punish breaches by altering the
amount of advertising. Finally, assume that each firm's demand (with
the fixed, equal price) is determined by the amount it advertises relative
to other firms. Specifically assume:
N




where Ai is firm i's advertising spending and qi is its unit sales. While
appearing formidable, this demand equation can be easily interpreted.
The parameter a is a constant between zero and one, which measures
the spillover effect-the elasticity of total market demand with respect
to the amount of advertising outlays. The positive parameter e meas-
ures the market-share effect-the "sensitivity of firms' market shares to
differences among their advertising outlays." 140
The profits of each firm, rri, are then:
"ri = (P - c)qi - Ai (App2)




and for the competitive (Nash) equilibria:
Acorn - e + (a - e) (App4
(P - c)qcom N
where A.01 and qcol, (ACoM and qcom respectively) represent the advertising
expenditures and output of each firm for the collusive (competitive)
equilibrium. The relationship between the output levels and advertis-
ing expenditures in both equations (App3) and (App4) can be charac-
terized as follows:
q = Na- 1 Aa (App5)
Substituting equation (App5) into equation (App3) and (App4), we can
derive the result of interest that Acoi, the collusive amount of advertis-
138. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
139. Schmalensee, supra note 51, at 375.
140. Id.
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ing, will equal Acorn, the competitive amount of advertising, if and only
if:
sign (A.o, - Ac..) = sign (a - e) (App6)
The interpretation of equation (App6) is that collusive advertising ex-
penditures will be greater than competitive advertising expenditures if
and only if a is greater than e-that is, if and only if the advertising
elasticity of market demand is greater than the sensitivity of firms' mar-
ket shares to advertising differences. When the spillover effect of ad-
vertising is greater than the market-share effect, collusion will increase
advertising spending. This means that punishing via advertisement can
entail either increasing or decreasing the collusive rate. When a = e,
the spillover effect and the market-share effect exactly cancel each other
so that A,., and Acorn will be the same. In this situation credible advertis-
ing punishments are not possible because neither the level of advertis-
ing nor the breaching firm's profits will be affected.
For other strategic variables (such as quality) that affect firm's rela-
tive market share, but that do not involve a spillover effect, a will be
zero, so that the collusive equilibrium amounts will be unambiguously
less than the competitive/punishment levels.
1987] 325
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